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Abstract  
Inclusive governance is significant to the realisation of democracy and peace dividends in states emerging from 
conflict. In principle, it offers platform for equitable representation of the ethnic majority, minority, marginalised 
and indigenous groups in public decision making bodies as well as ensuring that these groups benefit equally 
from development initiatives. In South Sudan, the exercise of inclusivity has been marred with contradictions 
between constitutional provisions and extant practices, for example, political parties are found to be the foci for 
rewarding the ‘warlords’ dubbed as freedom fighters at the expense of participatory civilian structures, the 
nerves of ethnic factionalism over nationalism, exercise of centralised nomination system, all of which breed 
disaffection and tensions among the citizenry.  Moreover, the observed militarisation of public service, 
perception of ethnic favouritism in public employment and appointments, the ‘felt’ development marginalisation 
of regions outside Central Equitoria, and unequal share of national resources comprise practices that violate the 
foundations of inclusive governance. In effect, these malpractices around inclusivity have fermented call for 
federalism (return to 23 semi-autonomous colonial districts with federal mandates) as a viable inclusive 
development platform over the current constitutionally mandated decentralisation (where South Sudan is sub-
divided into 10 states). These ills in the exercise of inclusivity compounded with the inability to meet the 25% 
quota threshold for women & minorities across appointive and elective positions cast doubt on the facets of 
legitimacy and accountability in post-CPA South Sudan. Thus, achieving consensual and inclusive state in South 
Sudan must begin with constitutionalism, citizen-accelerated and equitable development and political leadership 
open to salient arguments on federalism and state stability.   
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The application of Concepts inclusiveness, legitimacy, accountability and the state are interdependent and 
reinforce each other. Article 21 1  of universal declaration of Human Rights (adopted 1948) provides for 
democratic participation of everyone in the governance of his/her country whether directly or through freely 
chosen representatives. Article 22 of the same instrument entitles everyone to all rights and freedoms set forth in 
the declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour sex, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Therefore, in a democracy, inclusivity is achieved by 
citizens consenting to leadership emerging out of ‘free elections’ (legitimate) who in return are expected to 
exercise transparency (accountability) in their actions and decisions on behalf of the citizenry. In other words, 
the concepts of inclusivity, accountability and legitimacy form such a ‘reinforcing triangle’ in democratic states 
and remain important in realising the peace dividends in post conflict states such as South Sudan.      
Inclusivity could also be viewed in the realm of creating spaces for citizens’ voices in development and decision-
making processes. This space is important in improving the socio-economic and political opportunities for 
citizenry as espoused by Mwayu (2007). Put in the context of post conflict states, participation of the citizens in 
                                                          
1
 Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.  
Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.  The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
 
2
 Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
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development process is not only significant in building consensus on real needs of the people but also bringing 
the reality of peace dividends closer to the communities. Such dividends when realised and lived, will defer 
feelings of rebellion against the incumbent government and a possible relapse to violent conflict. Besides, 
participation entrenches the citizens’ right to influence the governance decisions of their country whether 
directly or indirectly.  
Inclusivity also implies equality before the law whether in the context of benefitting from development or 
representation of minorities or originally marginalised social groups such as the poor, women, ethnic and 
religious minorities, indigenous people and other disadvantaged groups. Indeed, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) and the Declaration on the Rights of National or Ethnic, Religious or 
Linguistic Minorities (UNDM) adopted by United Nations(1992) have both reiterated the need to have 
minorities exercise their political power across the legislative, executive and administrative spheres of their 
country as envisioned in Article 253 of the ICCPR. It also means that governance institutions and policies are 
accessible, accountable and responsive to majority, minority and disadvantaged groups, protecting their interests 
and providing diverse population with equal opportunity for public Services.  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides ground-breaking protection for the rights of 
peoples in its Articles 19–24. These cover the rights of peoples to self determination, existence, freedom from 
domination, to freely dispose of wealth and natural resources, cultural development, peace and security, and a 
satisfactory environment. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has not provided a general 
definition of the scope of the term ‘peoples’; however, in a number of cases, it has interpreted these rights as 
applying to communities with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics. Examined from this cue, critical 
examination of ethnic and minority representation in the public service of post-conflict South Sudan remains 
paramount as a measure of inclusive government.  
 
Based on various conceptualisation of inclusivity aforementioned, certain elements are found to cut across: 
equality before the law, citizenry participation, and citizenry representation in elective and appointive public 
positions. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, inclusivity is also viewed in realm of equal enjoyment of 
development and peace dividends in the context of post-conflict South Sudan. Moreover, the paper argues that 
all these virtues of inclusivity must be realised in a democratic space which largely embraces the concepts of 
accountable and instrumentally4 legitimate leadership. While focusing on post-conflict South Sudan since the 
signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005), this paper undertakes to examine the political 
dimensions of inclusive governance through the lenses of: political parties (the SPLM and opposition), the 2010 
elections and in(ex)clusivity, participation of women and minorities, citizenry engagement in constitution 
making process, and ethnic  inclusion in public service. In addition, the emergent demand for federalism despite 
the existence of constitutionally entrenched decentralised system of governance is examined through inclusivity 
realm.   
 
1.1 Methodology  
The study adopted a two-prong approach in data collection: Secondary data review and qualitative primary data 
collection methods. Reviews were carried out across the following documents: The interim constitution (2005), 
Transitional Constitution (2011), the elections and political parties Acts (2012), the Local Government Act 
(2009). Human Development Indices, Public Budget Documents and the international conventions/covenants on 
human rights and publications deemed authoritative on the statebuilding have been reviewed. Moreover, press 
statements by the government and the SPLM/IO (SPLM in opposition) have been analysed to contextualize 
emerging issues in the aftermath of December, 2013 conflict outbreak. These views are deemed significant since 
they speak to the political dimensions of statebuilding which is at the centre of this study. The aim of secondary 
review was to embed the findings of the study unto scientifically sound discussions documented about the 
process of statebuilding in South Sudan.  
Primary data (expert-interviews) were collected through semi-structured interviews held with government 
officers and heads of non-state institutions in Juba, leaders of political parties (the SPLM, SPLM/Io, SPLM-DC), 
the IGAD delegation mediating peace in South Sudan and representative of council of churches in South Sudan. 
These were complimented by the insider knowledge derived from discussions with policy makers, donor 
                                                          
3
 Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.  
4
 Instrumental legitimacy as used in this context refers to situation where the leadership is able to deliver on public goods and 
services as part of peace dividends in a satisfactory manner to the citizenry. 
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agencies and research institutions working in South Sudan on issues of statebuilding. Elite focus group 
discussions with Sudanese living in Kampala and Nairobi to capture the perceptions of Sudanese in the diaspora 
specifically at the outbreak of violent conflict in December, 2013. Community focus groups were held with 
South Sudanese with an aim of capturing the experiences and perceptions of citizens on inclusivity and service 
delivery, effectiveness of governance within the states and across the states. These groups comprised the leaders 
of the Boma, female and male university students, the business community and women groups from the larger 
Equitoria.  
1.2 Participatory Democracy as a theoretical underpinning of inclusive governance Beginning 1960s, 
participatory theorists and practitioners spelled out a conception of democracy based on the premise that citizens 
participating in collective decision-making on matters that affect their lives should be “an integral moral value of 
contemporary democratic theory” (Bachrach, 1975:52). For them, since any social relation is political in that it 
revolves around a structure of authority, increasing and extending the scope of participation and political 
equality entails democratizing society. Society “can be seen as being composed of various political systems, the 
structure of authority of which has an important effect on the psychological qualities and attitudes of the 
individuals who interact with them; thus, for the operation of a democratic polity at national level, the necessary 
qualities in individuals can only be developed through the democratization of authority structures in all political 
systems” (Pateman, 1970: 35). For this reason, “it is important that individuals take all the possible chances to 
participate” (Gbikpi, 2005:109). “Full participation” designates thus a process wherein “each individual member 
of a decision-making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions” (Pateman, 1970: 71). 
According to Lynd (1965), participatory democracy proposes to accomplish two specific goals: that each 
individual takes part in all decisions affecting the quality and conduct of his/her life; and that society is arranged 
to promote the independence of human beings and to provide the means for their common participation. This 
means that the participatory ideal can be interpreted as a design of social inclusion, which aims at 
institutionalizing a new democratic sovereignty relying on the dialectic between civil society and the political 
system (Santos, 2002). Allegretti reaches the same conclusion in Democrazia partecipativa. Esperienze e 
prospettive in Italia e in Europa (2010), when describing participatory democracy as a dynamic and open-ended 
project based on a “game” of active confrontation between civil society and institutions. In this light, social 
movements are regarded as one of the most important vectors of political change and transformation. On the one 
hand, they “carry on conflicts and antagonistic practices, breaking the limits of the systems in which such acts 
occur” (Melucci, 1985:795): collective mobilizations contest dominant codes and discourses of society. On the 
other hand, they point at creating a new symbolic order, a new cultural hegemony offering different 
interpretations of the social universe: in this respect, movements aspire to establish innovative definitions of 
norms and public situations, to promote new ideas, issues and solutions, and finally to invent alternative 
institutions. Even more radically, Santos retains that “democracies must transform themselves in social 
movements, in the sense that State must transform itself in an [open] space of cultural experimentation” (Santos 
2002:51). In the same vein, Claude Lefort envisions modern democracy as an “empty place” (Lefort, 2007) that 
possesses no definitive goals—or rather, it possesses many such goals but none can succeed “in being accepted 
as the incarnation of the people-as-one” (Cunningham, 2002:186). 
Participatory democracy is thus linked to a very strong notion of popular sovereignty, insomuch as it conceives 
of grassroots participation as a way to constitute, demolish, and reconstitute “the category of the people” (ibid., 
5). In other words, this position does not simply assume “the fact” of the demos (as a pre-existing body with a 
shared identity) as the base for democratic politics. This means that radical democratic sovereignty substantiates 
an ongoing conflict between those politically included and those not for the “re-signification” of the boundaries 
and identity of demos itself (Rancière, 2007). In this perspective, democracy becomes “a project concerned with 
the political potentialities of ordinary citizens”; with their capacity to become “political beings” (Wolin, 1996: 
31).  To synthesize, participatory approach addresses the “quantitative” dimension of mass democracy by 
emphasizing the political role of civil society. It intends to find out “how many people take part in how many 
political venues to make how many decisions” (Citroni, 2010: 41). Accordingly, participatory theory embraces 
and promotes the political inclusion of all individuals aiming at the enlargement and radicalization of democratic 
citizenship. 
2.0 South Sudan’s political parties: between elitism and inclusivity 
In the context of South Sudan, ethnic extracts and liberation fighters’ identities have defined the interactions and 
mobilisation strategies in the political landscape.  SPLM massive following as evidenced in the 2010 elections 
was largely on the basis of supporting liberators and independent heroes. “The people saw SPLM as the only 
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path to their freedom from the North (Sudan)”5. This perception painted SPLM as an outfit of freedom fighters 
where positions and candidacy in the party were negotiated on the perceived role at independence fight. “The 
citizenry was convinced that SPLM/A had the interests of South Sudanese and would work for non-discriminate 
state unlike the North, anyone of the contrary opinion was perceived to be against the subsequent independence 
that would follow in 2011”6.  Given the strong liberation identity with SPLM, it won a whopping 93% of the 
2010 elections with the opposition managing a paltry 7%.  
While the results of Elections in April 2010 may indicate a united and vision-driven SPLM/A, this is not the 
reality on the ground as the findings indicated. “...The struggle for people of South Sudan has taken 50 years and 
SPLM was formed in 1983 to liberate the South Sudanese, this popularised it as an independent party, however, 
even after independence, it has remained largely a liberation tool than transformative political party.”7 Similarly, 
opinion emerging from the South Sudanese university students points to lack of differentiation between SPLM as 
a military liberation tool and SPLM the political party with adequate structures to accommodate the non-
liberation fighters on board. They observed that reward for the elites within SPLM had overridden the country 
development agenda and a number of persons who never participated in liberation war against Sudan have 
always felt discriminated as members of the party, hence, SPLM in its current architecture fail the billing of a 
democratically sane political outfit open to majority of South Sudanese.  “SPLM might have won majority seats 
but it is yet to shed off its military identity that towards embracing a civilian outfit with real development and 
democratic ideals for the South Sudanese...this makes it an outfit for liberators than civilians”.8 In the lead-up to 
the 2010 elections, frustration with a centralized nomination process resulted in more than 350 SPLM members 
running as independent candidates.   
The failure of SPLM to hold consultative meetings through national conventions is largely responsible for 
cropping culture of exclusionary politics in SPLM.. While observing the tendencies and practices in SPLM,  the 
key informants in the study were of the opinion that: “SPLM has never held national convention to allow 
members align its structure to constitutional demand and democratically elect the party leadership…the fact that 
the party leader even dismissed elected party council members confirms that SPLM is leaning towards selected 
membership than participatory structure needed in a democracy”9.  These barriers have meant those disgruntled 
with party leadership have had to form their own parties as new political power bargaining platforms or fight 
within the SPLM with the latter resulting into dismissals and subsequent violent conflicts as witnessed in 
December, 2013.  In addition to its intra-party feuds, SPLM is still not yet registered as a political party as it has 
failed to agree on its constitution and other vital documents but being inseparable with government has allowed 
it to weather the storm of constitutional assault. The fact that SPLM is unable to consolidate itself on common 
ideologies and even fail to transcend the ethnic affiliations is a marker of exclusionary party politics that hamper 
the consolidation of democracy in post-conflict states. 
The SPLM is, therefore, painted as exclusionary and elitist party with its popular support and legitimacy in the 
2010 elections largely drawn from historical and euphoric support for independent parties in most African states. 
In practice, SPLM has entrenched itself as a party of reward for warlords and freedom fighters in the pre-CPA 
(2005) without any regard for the constitutionalism and free popular participation which would otherwise ensure 
that it enjoys symbolic legitimacy with South Sudanese. SPLM would be more inclusive if it would afford the 
South Sudanese a platform to consolidate their opinions, ideas and vie for public offices. At the moment, the 
opinions are mixed on what ideologies the SPLM is riding on with respect to the country’s socio-economic 
development and nationalisation of the citizen’s desire from the expansive rural areas of South Sudan. To 
strongly identify with liberation fighters at the expense of civilian driven-agenda except in vote hunting 
demonstrate exclusive political party traditions detrimental to a country healing from decades of conflict. On this 
front, Knopf (2013) posits that since the formation of SPLM, it has never succeeded in developing participatory 
civilian party structures with authentic grassroots mobilization and organization across communities and identity 
groups, such as women and youth groups.  
Ethnic cleavages and factionalism have come to rock the internal stability of SPLM as new alignments take 
shape in the aftermath of failed intra-party dispute resolution which peaked in 2013. More specifically, the 
perceived undermining of the SPLM members’ rights to make decisions on the affairs of their party following 
                                                          
5
 Interview with CSO official in South Sudan 
6
 FGD with male university student 
7
 Interview with a member of SPLM/A-IO 
8FGD with female university students 
9
 Interview a member of South Sudan political bureau  
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the disbandment of the council and sacking of the party members who expressed in their interest in vying as 
party flag bearers in the presidential race was conceived as dictatorial and a threat to internal democracy in 
SPLM… “SPLM leadership failed to honour party structures by failing call convention…then the members who 
dared to challenge the perceived dictatorial tendencies were dismissed from their positions including those in the 
cabinet…a grouping opposed to such actions under the former vice president emerged reinforcing the 
undercurrent Dinka-Nuer divide in SPLM.”10 The effect of such divisions has been bulkanisation of South 
Sudan regions on the basis of ethnic dominance and a relapse into inter-ethnic violence.  
Ethnicisation of SPLM demonstrates that as a ruling party, it is still deficient in inclusive political party practices 
that would manage competing demands across groups in the society by providing opportunities where citizens 
can influence decision-making process, debate policies and voice their concerns.  In analyzing the violent 
conflicts in South Sudan since December, 2013, the BTI (2014) concludes that the internal competition within 
SPLM has assumed ethnic dimensions on two major divisions, the Nuer-faction headed by former vice-
president, Riek Machar and the Dinka faction, headed by the president, Salva Kiir.  In previous studies, Daron 
and Robinson (2012) argue that political inclusivity not only reduces violence and instability but also contributes 
to development and growth. The virtue of political party inclusivity is therefore viewed as instrumental element 
in sustainable peace and state-building in countries emerging from conflict such as South Sudan.   In the study 
by Relly et al (2008), they contend that in volatile, conflict-prone or post-conflict societies, deficient political 
party structures can present even more hazardous consequences. They further observe that political competition 
in such societies often gravitates around sectarian, exclusive, often national or ethnic identities or geographic 
bases.  The fact that SPLM is beginning to lean towards ethnic sectarianism and polarisation is a political plague 
in need of immediate constitutional and national cohesions cure in the young state of South Sudan 
In analyzing the SPLM wrangles from June 2013 that led to an outbreak of South Sudan conflict in December, 
2013, Stignant (2013) concludes that events demonstrate that elections (2015) will also be a test of the SPLM’s 
ability to manage internal decision-making and selection processes in a democratic and peaceful manner. This is 
because beyond the top party leadership, contests will take place at the local level as candidates are nominated 
through the county, state and national structures heightening internal competition with possibility of further 
exclusion of candidates not loyal to party leadership but have grassroots support. Even more alarming is the fact 
the current violations are carried out in the context of legislations that prohibit the same as the Transitional 
Constitution (2011).11  As to whether this provision will be adhered to remain debatable given past experiences 
with 2010 elections under the Interim Constitution of South Sudan (2005-2011). However, without revised party 
electoral procedures and transparent decision-making process, the risk of similar tension remains high, as does 
the possibility of conflict which reinforce exclusionary politics perpetuated by political parties.  
The practices of SLPM indicate disregard for the national constitution by failure to hold convention and duly 
register as a political party, lack of internal democracy through centrally influenced political party nomination 
system and reward of the so called-freedom fighters with party positions, non-legislated party provisions for 
affirmative action on representation of the marginalized groups (ethnic minorities, women, the youth and persons 
with disability), emergent and persistent ethnic identities in SPLM  leading to factionalism over nationalism. 
Thus, to redeem SLPM as an inclusive party, both its internally democracy and respect for constitutionalism 
have to be prioritized with citizenry given ample space to participate in the SPLM affairs and determine the 
direction of the party in terms of governance.  
Opposition parties in South Sudan in relatively large numbers, with registrar indicating more than 23 (Stignant, 
2013), however, despite their numeral strength and presence, the opposition parties have almost no political 
influence and power.  These parties which would offer alternates to SPLM were found to be lacking in support 
base, deficient in institutional governance capacities and political programs; thus, they largely remain reactive 
outfits to SPLM without a measure of inclusionary practices. “...little is known of the agenda of opposition 
parties because after their apparent formation, they tend to operate almost like SPLM/A...no conventions for 
their members and they hardly criticise the government policies...”12  “The opposition parties are yet to reach the 
citizens  and identify with community wishes, people hardly know them except amongst the Shilluk people who 
have come to largely support SPLM-DC as was in 2010 elections, maybe the parties as just clubs for accessing 
                                                          
10
 FGD with business group from South Sudan  
11
 Article 26(1) provides every citizen with a right to participate in every level of the government directly or through freely 
chosen representative.., and shall have the right to nominate himself or herself, or to be nominated for a public office in 
accordance with the constitution. 
12
 Interview with NGO worker in South Sudan  
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power...nothing far from SPLM.”13 The findings allude to the fact the very formation of opposition parties by 
former SPLM strongmen means these parties (opposition) cannot form formidable force to fight exclusionary 
practices around ethnicity, unconstitutionalism and warlord reward system. These parties have adopted a strong 
ethnic identity and rotate around personalities rather than democratic ideals. Just like SPLM, adherence to the 
provision of the Political Parties Act (2012) and the TCSS (2011) provisions on political party conduct and 
structure remain remote in the opposition parties.  
In the political transformation index by BTI (2014), it is indicated that besides the SPLM-DC, the only serious 
(relatively organised) opposition parties in South Sudan are United Democratic Party (UDP) and the South 
Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF) with relative little influence. The insignificant influence on matters of national 
importance by the opposition when they claimed had insufficient representation on the National Constitutional 
Review Commission (NCRC), the body responsible for developing the country’s permanent constitution without 
altering the structure in 2012. How these opposition parties transform within the political space in need of 
collaborative leadership will be significant in influencing the inclusiveness of the political party architecture in 
2015 general elections, the first after independence and possible during the dispensation of permanent 
constitution.  
With respect to constitutionalism amongst the opposition, only a few held regular party conventions or 
established communication networks. “These parties do not even have offices, they are the bargaining chips for 
those able to galvanise some ethnic support.”14 The perceived weakness and unpopularity of the opposition 
parties with a majority of South Sudanese has meant that intra-SPLM squabbles would continue given its surety 
to win the next elections. “The absence of organised, participatory and citizen-driven opposition parties would 
always hand SPLM assured victory, that is why there’s intense fight to control but it would be better to 
democratise its institutions.” 15  It is imperative that a more civilian and ideologically-driven parties are 
constituted in South Sudan as part of sharing the political dividends of hard-won peace amongst citizenry. In this 
light, the Political Parties Act, passed in March 2012, mandated new and more rigorous requirements for 
registering political parties lauded as a mechanism of creating sanity in the political party operations in South 
Sudan. How far such progressive legislation billing will be lived up to is very significant South Sudan’s ethno-
politics in need of harmonisation. 
It is quite evident from the discussion that the political party system (both the ruling SPLM and the opposition) 
remain largely elitists. The parties have become defined avenues for negotiating power and accessing control 
over state resources by the country’s top elites. There is a tendency to reward former liberation fighters with 
party positions at the expense of universal suffrage and competitive politics extant in a democracy. This is 
witnessed in the parties’ candidate nomination practices (2010 elections) and the failure to hold national 
conventions where new leadership could be put in place. The political parties thus, by their non-conformity to 
law of the land have perpetuated the culture of unconstitutionalism in South Sudan. These parties unless 
reformed and governed according to the provisions of the constitution cannot be said to represent the wishes of 
the people but are more of elite clubs.  
 3.0 The 2010 elections: free or manipulated! 
Elections have become the principal means to legitimate the new leadership and institutions that emerge from a 
negotiated settlement to a civil war. Such post-conflict elections carry a tremendous burden. They are called 
upon to settle the contentious issues of internal and external legitimacy and must be organized under the difficult 
circumstances of societal disorder, general insecurity, fear, distrust, and institutional breakdown (Timothy, 
1998). In a number of cases, including Angola (1992), Cambodia (1993), El Salvador (1994), Mozambique 
(1994), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996), and Liberia (1997), elections have been designated in the peace accord as 
the mechanism for ending the transition (Krishna, 1998). 
 In south Sudan, the 2010 elections were part of the CPA (2005) provisions. The CPA called for a six-year 
transitional period during which the key provisions of the agreement would be implemented. “Elections meant a 
lot to South Sudanese who needed their voices to be heard at the National Legislation Assembly.” 16  The 
provisions of CPA (2005) included holding of national elections in Sudan to cement the country’s democratic 
transformation and put in place accountable governments in both Northern and Southern Sudan to oversee the 
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 FGDs with female university students 
14
 Interview with former SPLM council member 
15
 Interview with a member of SPLM/IO 
16
 Interview with South Sudan mediation team member 
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January 2011 referenda on self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei and popular 
consultations for South Kordofan and Blue Nile states to address any shortcomings of the CPA. “While it is clear 
that CPA had provided for elections, it was more of a solidarity test for the people in the South who were eager 
to signal the North about impending separation towards self-rule.”17  While the elections in 201 should have 
been conducted in a democratic manner to bear to the principles of inclusive governance, they turned out to be 
elite-driven and deprived of the general citizenry’s expectations. On overall, the conduct of the political parties’ 
elites contradicted the politically inclusive virtue advanced by Wolin (1996:31) that democracy becomes “a 
project concerned with the political potentialities of ordinary citizens”; with their capacity to become “political 
beings”.   
In Southern Sudan, the 2010 elections resulted in overwhelming majorities for the SPLM. While the presidential 
election, which resulted in the election of President Salva Kiir, was deemed generally free and fair by 
international observers within the semi-autonomous region of Southern Sudan, observers believed the SPLM 
manipulated state elections to provide for the election of SPLM governors in some states where nomination 
certificates of SPLM were given to party-preferred candidates rather than the real winners of party primaries. 
“South Sudanese were united in their quest for transparent elections but officials of SPLM literally rigged out 
‘non-liberators’ popular with the people at the expense of party-preferences...this was the beginning of 
diminishing popular participation.”18  The effect of such practices was a disaffcetionate citizenry, political party 
hopping (where dissidents in the SPLM primaries either ran as independent candidates or joined the opposition 
parties) and violent actions. In its report on the 2010 elections in South Sudan, the Carter Centre (2011) observed 
that public perception of manipulated elections for SPLM governors in Jonglei and Unity states triggered 
violence, resulting in deaths and injuries in 2010.  
The political climate under which elections took place in South Sudan was wanting. The findings indicate that 
incidences of insecurity and candidate-targeted violence remained large contributors to exclusionary political 
practices. “The election environment was in a limbo of its own, freedom of expression was limited, civilians and 
opposition members who dared to challenge the government were detained unlawfully.”19 According to Human 
Rights Watch (2010) report on Sudan 2010 Elections,  in one incident, on February 18, security officials arrested 
three members of the opposition party, SPLM-DC - Denis Aywork Yor, Priyjwok Akol Ajawin, and Amjad 
Angelo Marino - at Juba airport, took them to a nearby military detention center, and questioned them separately 
for several hours about their political party activities. The men spent the night at the detention center before 
military officials transferred them to a police station, where they were later released without charge. Human 
Rights Watch also found that the media environment in South Sudan has deteriorated significantly in recent 
weeks. For example, on March 3, armed security officials stormed the offices of Bakhita FM, a community-
based radio station run by the Catholic Church, and Liberty FM, a private radio station, and arrested the two 
directors at the stations. The incident occurred after Liberty FM aired an interview with the campaign manager 
of an independent political candidate in Juba. 
These practices could only work to ferment violent conflicts and deny the citizenry free space to elect their 
leaders as envisaged in inclusive governance principles. More appalling was the fact that the state allowed its 
agents of maintains law to perpetuate arrests aimed at silencing the dissident voices from the government. “The 
experience of 2010 elections reinforced the need to separate the party from the army so that democracy in South 
Sudan can thrive without the police or military interferences in politics”20 In her assessment of the legitimacy of 
the 2010 elections, Knopf (2013) concludes that the elections were marred by intimidation and violence by the 
SPLM, therefore, the question of independent choices remained compromised.  
In addition to violent environment, the study indicated that a majority of voters in the elections were not aware 
of their obligations, rights and responsibilities in the process. In civic education was largely remote making the 
elections exercise amenable to elite manipulation. Compounding such voter ignorance is the high illiteracy rates 
found in the rural areas where a majority of South Sudanese reside. “It could have been the case where people 
were voting euphorically or on the advice of some political aspirants who would manipulate the 
circumstances...we needed to have sensitised the people.”21 It can only be hoped that provisions of South Sudan 
Elections Act (2012) will significantly help in voters’ sensitisation before elections of 2015.  
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The 2010 South Sudan elections present a zero-sum exercise that was characterised by the phenomenon of 
‘electoral choiceness’, in which the winners were predetermined by the ruling elites in the SPLM and the losers 
were handed defeated with no alternative route to recourse.  The environment and the definitive events around 
candidates’ nomination, SLPM rigging, voter and candidate intimidation including use of violence are not only 
recipes for exclusionary political party systems but also the root causes of general disaffection of the citizenry in 
the ability of SPLM to lead a unitary, inclusive and political heterogeneous South Sudan into sustainable 
development path.  
The elections of 2010 in South Sudan while attracting large participation of people was in itself exclusive and 
exercise that does not fit the billing of democratic process.  While the outcomes of the same was legitimized, it 
must be pointed that the very lack of information amongst the citizenry on the demands of electoral  process, the 
regulations, the use of violence by SPLM members, the shambolic  and centralized party nomination process 
amounted to exclusionary political practices. There was a large scale ignorance of electoral regulations 
compounded by lack of established legal systems for seeking redress on electoral disputes. Hence, by its 
characterization, the 2010 election was not only exclusionary but entrenched the ‘electoral choiceness’ where 
elites were the largest beneficiaries hence a  political loss  to the local citizenry whom had largely expected that 
their preferred candidates would largely appeal to the popular SPLM party and prevail in the elections.  
The dominance of SPLM in the semi-autonomous region of South Sudan during the 2010 elections is evident in 
the manner that it produced all the representatives to the former council of states under the Government of 
National unity from the Southern Constituencies as summarised in table 3.1. similarly, the SPLM won 87 seats 
from the Southern Constituencies to the former National Assembly of the Republic of Sudan compared to NCP’s 
2 and SPLMDC’s 1 in the 2010 elections as summarised in table 3.2. 
Table 3.1: Representatives of Southern Sudan in the Former Council of States of the Republic of Sudan 
State  No. of Representatives Party designation 
Central Equatoria 2 SPLM 
Lakes  2 SPLM 
Jongolei 2 SPLM 
Western Equatoria 1 SPLM 
Western Bahr- El Ghazal 2 SPLM 
Upper Nile 1 SPLM 
Warrap 2 SPLM 
Unity 1 SPLM 
Northern Bahr- El Ghazal 2 SPLM 
Total  15  
SOURCE: South Sudan Statistical Year Book, 2011 
Table 3.2: Former Members of National Assembly of the Republic of Sudan elected from Southern 
Constituencies. 
STATES  
PARTY  Upper 
Nile 
Central 
Equatoria 
Warrap Lakes Unity Eastern 
Equatoria 
Northern 
Bahr- el 
Ghazal 
Western 
Bahr- el 
Ghazal 
Western 
Equatoria  
Jongolei 
SPLM 10 12 12 8 6 10 8 3 6 12 
NCP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
IND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
USAP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SANU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UDSEM           
UDF           
SPLMDC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: South Sudan Statistical Year Book,  2011 
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4.0 Participation of Women and Minorities 
4.1 The CPA and women’s political representation in South Sudan  
The independence of South Sudan came with various forms of expectations and hope for better future for all 
South Sudanese through democratic governance, gender equality and stronger voices and participation of all 
groups of people in policy making and governing bodies of the new country. The CPA (2005) stipulated a 25 per 
cent for women’s representation in all levels of government in recognition of their roles and contributions and to 
the liberation struggle. The interim period from 2005 to 2010 saw a number of women get into decision-making 
positions in the former Government of South Sudan where women made up 28 of the 170 parliamentarians in the 
Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly with another five women in the Council of states.  
Gender equality is recognized in Republic of South Sudan’s (RSS) key governance instruments, including the 
Transitional Constitution (2011) as central pillars for building lasting peace and sustainable development, a 
belief that is shared by those in the country’s leadership. “The voices of women in public sphere have been 
enshrined both in the TCCs and CPA, what matters most is how far we can implement those provisions in our 
country.”22 The transitional constitution requires at least 25 percent female participation in the legislative and 
executive branches of government at the national and state levels. At the time of independence in 2011, women 
held 99 of the 332 seats in the NLA but occupied only five of the 50 seats in the Council of States in South 
Sudan. The Government of South Sudan had largely not met the 25 percent representation requirement for 
women at the state level. Five women served in the 21-member cabinet, while four of 12 deputy ministers were 
women.  The second period beginning in 2011 to 2015 indicates a near-double in women’s representation in the 
Legislative Assembly under the Transitional Constitution (2011). “The figures are impressive given that we are a 
young nation but we need to make women to be elected beyond just constitutional reservations.”23 Table 4.1 
below gives a summary of the representation of by gender at the National and County levels as of 2010 elections 
in South Sudan. 
Table 4.1: Gender Representation at National and State Levels of the Government of Sudan. 
 STATES 
  
Assembly 
SSLA Upper 
Nile 
Jongolei  Unity  Warrap  N.BG W.BG Lakes W.E E.E C.E 
Gender Male  114 36 35 36 36 36 36 35 35 35 35 
Female  53 10 12 12 12 11 12 13 11 13 12 
% of seats filled 
by women 
32 22 26 25 25 23 25 27 24 27 26 
Source: South Sudan Year Book, 2011 
Whereas the provisions of the CPA(2005) were candid and clear on the slots for women in the governance 
architecture of the Government of South Sudan, the failure to meet this requisite was largely blamed on the high  
illiteracy levels of women in South Sudan (UN Women, 2011).  While reflecting on the slow realisation of 
women’s political participation South Sudan, Jane Kani (2011) contends that contestations and challenges to 
women’s political participation cut across socio-economic issues such as differential education status, age, 
marital status, class family background, ethnic and regional variations, all of which affect the ability of women 
in South Sudan to effectively take up their positions in the decision-making organs. In observing the fate of 
Sudanese women, consensus form FGDs indicates the need to shore up education level of girls and increase 
public investment in girls’ training so that more females can benefit from the constitutional provisions. “The 
state has to as a matter of urgency invest in the education and training of women so that opportunities towards 
enjoyment of such provisions become a reality if are ever to achieve an inclusive governance”24 
The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011) hereafter referred to as TCSS (2011) provides for 
promotion of women’s political participation. In Article 16(4a) 25 , the TCSS reaffirms South Sudan’s 
commitment to inclusive governance that embraces itself to gender diversity and the historical role that women 
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 Interview with government officer from Juba  
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 Interview with South Sudanese female attorney 
24
 FGDs with female university students 
25
 Article 16(4a) it states that all levels of government shall promote women’s political participation in public life and their 
representation in the legislative and executive organs by at least 25% as an affirmative action to redress imbalances created 
by history, customs and traditions. 
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played in the quest for self determination. In this respect, the Electoral Act (2012) to be implemented in the 
subsequent elections states that (Article 60(2)) the National Legislative Assembly is composed of members 
elected as: 60% representing geographical constituencies in the Republic of South Sudan (RSS), 25% 
representing women elected on the basis of proportional representation at the national level, and 15% elected on 
the basis of proportional representation on the closed party lists. While this is a great indicator, there are blind 
spots to the extent that no legal sanctions are put in place for non-compliance with such provisions. Similarly, 
there are no provisions for rank order in the political parties’ lists. 
With respect to the composition and inclusion in the Council of States, there is a total break from the presidential 
influence as originally witnessed. In the current Council of States all representatives of the former Council of 
States of Sudan and 25% representatives appointed by the president of South Sudan are members, a provision 
which in itself was gender neutral. Under Article16(4) of the TCSS(2011), it is clear that the Council of States 
shall promote women’s participation in public life and their representation in the legislative and executive organs 
by at least 25% as an affirmative action to redress imbalances created by history, customs, and traditions. In the 
Electoral law (2012)26, the election of women is provided for under the reserved vote for the fourth person who 
has to be a woman.  While this is a promissory dividend for women of South Sudan, compliance with this 
provision in the net elections (possibly 2015) will be a great determinant of its realisation. “The TCSS and its 
predecessor Interim Constitution have championed for great changes, the political will might be a significant 
player in the implementation so that women and men are equitably represented in all levels of governance”27. 
These views might only express the practice inherent amongst post-conflict states where law de jure does not 
match law de facto.  
With respect to the decentralised units especially the State Assemblies and the executive organs, the TCSS 
(2011) values in the input and participation of women. In Article 162 and 163, it states that the territory of South 
Sudan is composed of ten states governed on the basis of decentralisation out of which there shall be legislative 
and executive arms. Thus, in fulfilment of the principle of affirmative action, women shall be allocated at least 
25% of the seats and positions in each legislative and executive organ of each state, without prejudice to their 
right to compete for remaining seats and positions in such organs.  Indeed, the Electoral Act (2012) in Article 
(61) states that the total number of members of the States Assembles for the whole country shall be 400 men and 
women to be apportioned to states by the commission in accordance with the population size of each state: 60% 
of the members shall be elected to represent geographical constituencies at the level of the state concerned; 25% 
of women shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation at the state level  from closed women list; 
and 15% of the members shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation at the state from closed 
party lists.  However, there are no legal sanctions for non-compliance with these provisions as well as lack of 
placement rules in the party lists which mighty present post elections legal loopholes which might largely deny 
women an opportunity to participate fully in the affairs of their government as elected representatives.  
On the representation of women and minorities, the CPA (2005), the TCSS (2011) and the Elections Act (2012) 
are more pronounced on the necessary affirmative action that would redress the cultural, historical and other 
discriminatory practices that have kept women away from decision-making organs. More specifically, these 
legislations have provisioned for women’s election into the National Legislation Assembly, the State Assemblies 
and their respective executive organs, and the Council of states. However, there is a silence on the fate of 
minorities, lack of established mechanisms for ethnic inclusion and representation coupled with silence on 
legislative sanctions for non-compliance with the stated provisions that are to be effected in the next elections.  
5.0 The permanent constitution making: Where are the citizens? 
The TCSS (2011) gives the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) authority to write and submit 
to the President of the Republic a draft constitutional text and explanatory report. The TCSS (2011) outlines a 
process to be undertaken in as far as achieving this objective is concerned in articles 202 and 203. The 
Constitution (TCSS, 2011) identifies four stages through which the permanent constitution-making exercise will 
pass before the promulgation of its resultant supreme document. These stages include the National Constitutional 
Review Commission, the National Constitutional Conference, the National Legislature and the assent of the 
president (Sudd Institute, 2013). It must be emphasized at this level that the multi-stage approach aimed at 
                                                          
26
 Article 60(3) states that there shall be four representatives from each state in the Council of States   elected by members of 
the State Legislative Assembly. Every member of the State Legislative Assembly shall have four votes one of which must be 
cast for a woman. The top four candidates with highest number of valid votes shall be declared elected. 
27
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achieving a participatory and inclusive process largely informed by citizenry engagement on a document that 
would capture their vision for South Sudan.   
The NCRC as per Article 202, sections 6, 7, and 8 of the TCSS(2011) is charged with conducting a nation-wide 
public information sharing and civic education programs on constitutional issues, soliciting experts’ assistance, 
collect views and suggestions from all relevant stakeholders, and review the Transitional Constitution. None of 
the provisions for public opinion solicitation has ever been conducted by the NRC since it took office in 2012 
literally transferring the constitution process ownership to the political class. “Constitution making process has 
become a Juba (government) project which abuses the citizens’ rightful entitlement.”28 “…at the moment, very 
few South Sudanese are aware of the ongoing process albeit they are to be the consumers of those legislations”29. 
“It seems like the political class and the executive have appropriated the constitution making instead of building 
consensus with the citizenry.”30 There is a leaning towards believing that local citizens are ‘illiterate’ and would 
not have substantive input in the review process, and if they had any of that input, already their interests are 
catered for by the delegates whose selection process in itself was contested. How such a document will reflect 
the popular demands of people with respect to peace dividends remains elusive. 
The review and constitution making process is dominated by the political class in terms of the composition. For 
instance, Sudd Institute (2013) notes that the National Constitutional  Review Commission (NCRC), which 
currently comprises 55 members, have 44 of this 55 member body representing political parties, with the 
remaining 11 being shared 7, 2, 2 by the civil society organizations, faith-based groups, and a supposedly non-
party affiliated Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson, respectively. This makes the process elitist and excusive to 
a majority of the citizens in South Sudan who are to be governed by the outcomes of such processes. While 
examining the constitution making process in South Sudan, Cook et al (2013) observe that the basic concept of a 
written constitution providing the formal rules for how the state will function is still not familiar to most South 
Sudanese. However, the government officers feel otherwise “In our current constitution, there is a provision for a 
constitutional conference because this constitution upon drafted shall be tabled in an all constitutional 
conference, that will discuss the constitutions and it is there and then where all the issues of governance will be 
discussed; the system of governance that we want in place, but now people have gone ahead of time and brought 
in federalism here.”31 
 
In South Sudan, the government made efforts to demonstrate representation from a variety of regions and ethnic 
groups, although it had not established any formal mechanism to achieve such balance (CHR, 2013). As a result, 
some ethnicities remained unrepresented in government. Although NCRC consultation sessions throughout the 
year aimed to include women, traditional leaders, civil society, and youth groups as participants, many 
complained of a lack of information from the government on the review process. The absence of a translation of 
the constitution in Arabic or local languages limited the ability of local and minority populations to engage 
meaningfully in dialogue and caused low turnout for several consultations around the country.  
Securing citizen-driven and productive state in South Sudan must begin with constitution making. In most post-
conflict scenarios, many people are governed by rules that they do not understand, respect or accept as is likely 
to be the case in South Sudan with the permanent constitution. In addition, a majority of the rural residents and 
those basically outside the political elite will not be reached for consultation on a document so significant to their 
lives. South Sudan must not adopt such a top-down approach in its pursuit for a permanent constitution. Should 
this happen, South Sudan would end up with a set of institutional arrangements that are immaterial to the lives of 
its citizens and the problems that they face and hence, cannot enhance governance and deal effectively with the 
problems that confront citizens. Thus, constitution making in South Sudan must be bottom-up, people-driven, 
inclusive and participatory. All citizens, regardless of their educational achievements, wealth status, ethnic 
origin, or religious affiliation, must be granted the space to participate fully and effectively in constitution 
making. 
On participatory permanent constitution making, the process and the mechanism of adopting the outcome remain 
exclusive and elitist in nature. That the process remains politically dominated is evident in the NCRC’s 
composition with the civil society and other interest groups given the least slots. The failure of the NCRC to 
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consult with the citizenry on the process of constitution making can only be interpreted to mean that South 
Sudanese will be recipients rather than producers of their new law. 
5.0 The quest for federalism  
It is significant to note that the governance architecture in South Sudan is on the basis of decentralized 
government.32  The TCSS (2011) establishes three levels of government-national, state, and local aimed at 
bringing the government services and goods closer to people while at the same time capture the aspirations of the 
citizenry in the development process. However, the failure of the system to deliver on these noble goals coupled 
with powerful presidency33 created by the TCSS (2011) has fueled the quest for a federal system of government 
as a viable alternate.  
 
As of December 2013 at the outbreak of conflict, the call towards creation of federal states has grown louder 
than before. The reasons range from economic and resource sharing inequities observed under the current 
governance system, the ethnic discrimination in the public service appointments, and inequitable development 
across states with perceived concentration of development in Central Equitoria. In the recent past, the need to 
engage constructively and meaningfully on federalism surcafed at the Addis-Ababa negotiations  within the 
thematic group dealing with the system of governance “We acknowledge that a federal system of governance is a 
popular demand of large section of the population of South Sudan and therefore agree to reflect it by way of 
effective devolution of more powers to the states in this agreement particularly in the areas of security, judicial 
administration, law enforcement, fiscal reforms and public sector reforms.”34 The thematic group went ahead to 
press that the issue of federalism needed to be addressed in the permanent constitution making process and in the 
event that a transitional government is put in place, they would review the number of states with a view to 
increase or reduce to give effect to federalism. 
 
These foundations in the quest for federalism also emanate from the fact the Transitional Constitution 2011 does 
not name the current decentralized system as federal, hence, the sharing of governance power is viewed as a 
quasi arrangement in which the presidency (executive) has an overriding power in socio-economic and political 
decision-making as exemplified in the interviews: “South Sudan is a rich country and we had oil revenue of 
almost like half a Billion dollars in a month…the problem is that the resources do not reach the 10 states to fuel 
any poverty eradication scheme neither boost Agricultural production hence the quest for legally constituted 
federal states”35 Focus group discussions revealed that the discriminate/delayed release of development money to 
the states as provisioned for in the TCSS (2011) was partly responsible for the conflict but more so a reason to 
for federalism quest: “The National Government has been slow in releasing money meant for development 
purposes as in chapters two and three only paying recurrent expenditures…the practice generally delay delivery 
of public goods and services hence people feel  the current administrative system is fully devolved and resourced 
to meet their needs”. 36   
Thus, the perceived concentration of development process and economic functions in the hands of the National 
Government is largely viewed by South Sudanese as a cause of marginalization in the Country’s development 
process, a situation which ought to have been remedied by peace dividend provisions. “The development is Juba-
driven rather than from the Boma to Payam to the county to the state.”37 It is such a top-down approach that is 
seen to be disempowering the local citizenry who are forced to vacate their villages to search for better 
opportunities in Juba where development is thought to be concentrated… “If the National Government no longer 
gives the youths the money as was in the time of Garang’, the states have little development and employment 
opportunities to keep youths engaged, then an automatic scramble for Juba opportunities will continue…that is 
why we need equitable share of resources across  all the states”38. “They only take 20% to states, 80% remains in 
                                                          
32
 TCSSS Article 4: South Sudan is governed on the basis of a decentralized democratic system and is an all embracing 
homeland for its people. It is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-religious and multi-racial entity where such 
diversities peacefully co-exist.  
33
 Rut, 2014 notes that the presidential system of government in South Sudan is a winner-takes-all system. This model leads 
to a monosepalous (one head) system where the head of state is also the head of the executive arm of government and this 
leads to over-concentration of power in the hands of one person. 
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the centre...the states will only divide only 10% to the counties or less...that is not the best kind of Federalism. 
It’s like a triangle turned upside down; many offices up there, services are done up there and decisions are done 
up there”39 all which are key elements expressing dissatisfaction with the administrative arrangement in place as 
not impacting the needy country-side.  
While the challenges about under the present system, some of the state officers in the study were of the opinion 
that the whole process has to be handled cautiously and research driven “For Federalism, we need to conduct a 
thorough research, even Ethiopia is a federal state and there are so many challenges...the government is not 
against federalism but we are saying give yourself time and make a thorough study so that when  you come up 
with your position patch it up, argue it out so that when the time comes for a decision we will decide from an 
informed decision.”40 In response to recent thematic proposals on federal governance system, the Government of 
the Republic of South Sudan representatives at the negotiations acknowledged the popular demand and made a 
promise to the extent that “the TGONU41 shall devolve more powers to the states during the transitional period 
through the institutional reforms in accordance with the provisions of this agreement (negotiations)… shall 
through the permanent constitution making process study and come up with the type of federalism or any other 
system of governance appropriate to the people of South Sudan.” 42 
 
There is also the observed insubordination of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly, the judiciary and the 
security by the executive. This is seen as an affront to state interest whose cure would come in establishing 
legislated semi-autonomous territories in South Sudan with ability to have a say in security apparatus. Hence, 
there is need for the Government of South Sudan to re-think equal participation of the various ethnic groups in 
public service and enjoyment of peace dividends on equitable levels across all the states as debates and 
consultations are carried out on the feasible federal system applicable to South Sudan.  
Federalism as presently advocated is viewed as a remedy to corruption that has become endemic in the public 
sector, a more bottom-up system of governance and initiation of development processes, closer delivery of 
services to the citizenry on the basis of locally defined priorities and demands thus satisfying the peace-dividend 
expectations. In essence, taming negative mobilization of ethnic extracts in South Sudan will largely rely on how 
their socio-economic and political expectations are met and dealt with, this thinking at the moment; seem centred 
on federalism as the kind of governance architecture to bring closure to citizenry who still feel economically and 
politically in the post-South Sudan independence era.  
Conclusion  
The theoretical foundations and the practical significance of inclusive governance in a democratic society remain 
sound and relevant, and, by extension need to be pursued. The political dimensions of inclusivity discussed as at 
the creation of South Sudan in the post CPA (2005) point to abundance of opportunities and a lull in the 
implementation at the same time. Stability and development of South Sudan depends largely on how the socio-
economic and political factionalism capped with open rebellion is handled. This has to begin with the political 
elite loosening up their grip on power, embracing all-encompassing political completion, delivering the social 
goods to citizenry, de-ethnicizing and demilitarizing the public service so that all South Sudanese enjoy the 
equality provision under the Constitution.  The paper therefore concludes that well-placed series of planned and 
coordinated development activities will manage the expectations, positively impact the perceptions of South 
Sudanese while at the same time reconcile the strained citizen-state relations. GoSS has to embrace a national 
dialogue aimed at re-uniting the citizens to nationalistic values, resurrecting the public trust in governance and its 
leadership and managing the peace dividend expectations. The aim of such undertaking is not only to sustain 
inclusive system but also an essential element in avoiding fragmentation and violence.  
Recommendations  
• Equitable delivery of public service and goods: The GoSS should put put strategic measures to meet the 
different development demands of its 10 states by devolving additional equalisation funds to states with high 
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 TGONU is the acronym for Transitional Government of National Unity under negotiation in Ethiopia after the outbreak of 
conflict in December, 2013.  
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poverty indices. This will demand that the GoSS discusses with state leadership, citizens and development 
partners the priorities and introduce ‘discriminate measures’ aimed at delivering much needed development 
interventions as per the lens of beneficiaries. 
• De-ethnicising public service: GoSS has to establish an independent public service commission in its 
permanent constitution mandated to look into the issues of ethnic balance and professionalising the public 
sector. A key interest would to ensure that the sector is de-scaling the militarisation of public service and 
striking equitable ethnic balance in the sector to restore inclusive feeling amongst the general public.  
• Political parties: The parties as institutions of mobilising citizen agenda on national issues need to adopt the 
democratic principle of universal suffrage as espoused both in the TCSS(2011) and the political parties 
Act(2012). Aspects of elitism and centralised nomination systems witnessed in SPLM might only serve 
grow disaffection amongst the citizens in parties as vehicles of democracy in South Sudan. The registrar of 
political parties in the GoSS must closely monitor the political party activities on the extent to which 
constitutionalism is adhered to and advise where blatant violations of the law are committed.  
• Women, youth and ethnic minorities: The already legislated quota system is a significant step in ensuring 
representation of women in public leadership, however, the permanent constitution should make affirmative 
provisions for the youths and ethnic minorities on the same with clearly spelt legal sanctions for non-
compliance. Investment in the education of the youth and women including should be prioritised to ensure 
sustainable and full participation in the affairs of South Sudan. 
• Permanent constitution making: There is need to hold consultative workshops with the citizenry across 
states on the contents of the document. This should be spearheaded by the NRC and civil societies so that a 
consensus is reached on the document that will shape the new socio-economic and political structure of 
South Sudan. Consultative processes will help to consolidate citizen participation, ownership and identity 
with document rather than making the whole process elite-driven. 
• Federalism: The Government has to form a bipartisan committee to work with the NRC to debate a 
workable model of federalism that will fit South Sudan. More importantly, the model has define the issues 
of powers between national government and states, the development planning and resource allocation and 
inter-governmental relations. A clear federal schedule in the permanent constitution needs to spell out the 
functions and objectives of federalism.  
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